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Abstract: We provide a new perspective to the literature on social desirability of 
entry by showing that, if the input supplier has market power, social desirability of 
entry of the final goods producers depends on returns to scale. Entry in the final goods 
market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to scale technology, but it 
can be socially excessive under decreasing returns to scale technologies if the cost of 
entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently competitive. Hence, the anti-
competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable if the final goods market is 
characterised by decreasing returns to scale technologies. 
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1. Introduction 
In a seminal paper, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show that entry is socially 
excessive in oligopolistic industries with scale economies and this holds irrespective 
of the type of technology, such as constant returns or non-constant returns. This 
“excess-entry theorem”, which may justify the anticompetitive entry regulation 
policies adopted by many countries,
1
 ignored an important aspect, viz., the market 
power of the input suppliers creating strategic input price determination.
2
 However, in 
real world, the presence of labour unions or certain key input suppliers, such as the 
computer chip producer like Intel, may justify market power of the input suppliers in 
many industries. We show that if the input suppliers have market power, social 
efficiency of entry of the final goods producers depends on their technologies. 
Considering a competitive input market, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) show 
that entry is socially excessive. Ghosh and Morita (2007a, b) argue that if the input 
suppliers have market power, the result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) may not 
hold and entry can be socially insufficient. We contribute in this literature by showing 
that if the input supplier has market power, social desirability of entry depends on 
returns to scale. Entry is socially insufficient under constant returns but it is socially 
excessive under decreasing returns
3
 if the cost of entry is sufficiently low. Hence, the 
policy implication of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) remains in the presence of 
significant market power of the input suppliers if there are decreasing returns in the 
final goods production and the cost of entry is sufficiently low. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Consider an industry with a large number of symmetric final goods producers, each of 
whom decides whether or not to enter the market. Entry requires each final goods 
producer to incur an entry cost 𝐾 > 0. Assume that there exists an input supplier that 
                                                 
1
 Preventing excessive entry was a guiding principle in the Japanese industrial policy in the postwar 
period (Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987 and Suzumura, 1995). 
2
 One may look at Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), Anderson et al. (1995), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), 
Cabral (2004), Ghosh and Saha (2007), Mukherjee (2012), for a representative sample of the papers on 
social efficiency of entry with competitive input markets. 
3
 The implications of decreasing returns to scale technologies, which can be motivated by capacity 
constraints or scarcity of resources, have been discussed extensively in different contexts (Tirole, 
1988). Banker et al. (1994) show that decreasing returns may prevail in the software industry. Saal et 
al. (2007) found constant or decreasing returns in the UK industries. The typical two-digit industries in 
the US (Basu and Fernald, 1997), three-digit manufacturing industries in Singapore (Kee, 2002), 
Broadacre industries in Australia (Townsend et al., 1998) appear to have (slightly) decreasing returns 
to scale.  
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supplies inputs to all the final goods producers. To illustrate our result in a simple 
fashion we assume that input supplier unilaterally sets the input price. 
Consider the following game. At stage 1, the final goods producers decide 
whether or not to enter the market. At stage 2, the input supplier determines the input 
price. At stage 3, the final goods producers, which entered the market, produce 
outputs simultaneously by purchasing inputs according to their requirements and the 
profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 
For simplicity we assume that the final goods producers have symmetric 
production technologies  and they can transform the inputs to a homogeneous final 
good at zero cost. We consider the case of constant returns to scale technology in 
Section 2.1 and the case of decreasing returns to scale technology in Section 2.2. 
Assume that the inverse market demand function is P = a – Q, where P is 
price and Q is the total output.  
 
2.1. Constant returns to scale technology 
Assume that the production technology of the jth firm, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , ∞, is 𝐿𝑗 = 𝑞𝑗,  
where 𝐿𝑗   is the amount of input and 𝑞𝑗 is the output. 
If n final goods producers enter the market, the ith final goods producer 
maximises the following expression to determine its output: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝜋𝑖
𝐶𝑅𝑆 =(𝑃 − 𝑤)𝑞𝑖 − 𝐾.        (1) 
The equilibrium output of the ith firm is 
 𝑞𝑖
𝐶𝑅𝑆 =
𝑎−𝑤
1+𝑛
.         (2) 
The input supplier maximises the following expression to determine the input price: 
 
1
( )
n
CRS
i
w
i
MaxU w c q

          (3) 
where 𝑐 represents the marginal cost of input production. The equilibrium input price 
is 𝑤𝐶𝑅𝑆 =
𝑎+𝑐
2
. 
The equilibrium net profit of the ith final goods producer, i=1,2,…,n, which 
has entered the market is  
𝜋𝑖
𝐶𝑅𝑆 =
1
4
(
𝑎−𝑐
1+𝑛
)
2
− 𝐾.                   (4) 
For analytical convenience, we consider the number of firms as a continuous variable. 
Hence, entry in the market occurs as long as the net profit of a final goods producer is 
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non-negative. Given the symmetry of the firms, the free entry equilibrium number of 
final goods producers is given by 0CRSi   or 
1
4
(
𝑎−𝑐
1+𝑛
)
2
= K.                    (5) 
It follows from (5) that, if the cost of entry (i.e., K ) falls, the free entry equilibrium 
number of final goods producers, n, increases. 
Now we determine the welfare maximising number of final goods producers, 
where welfare is the sum of the total net profits of the final goods producers 
(∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝐶𝑅𝑆), the profit of the input supplier (𝑈𝐶𝑅𝑆) and consumer surplus (𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑆). 
Following the literature, we consider the second-best problem of welfare 
maximisation, i.e., we determine the welfare maximising number of final goods 
producers subject to Cournot behaviour of the firms. Hence, the social planner can 
control the number of final goods producers entering the market, but it cannot control 
the output choice behaviour of the final goods producers. 
If n final goods producers produce the final good, it follows from (4) that the 
total net profit of the n firms is  
∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝐶𝑅𝑆 =
n
4
(
𝑎−𝑐
1+𝑛
)
2
− 𝑛𝐾.               (6) 
The profit of the input supplier is  
𝑈𝐶𝑅𝑆 =
𝑛(𝑎−𝑐)2
4(1+𝑛)
.        (7) 
Since the total final goods production is 𝑄𝐶𝑅𝑆 = 𝑛 (
𝑎−𝑤
1+𝑛
), the consumer surplus is 
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑆 =
𝑄2
2
=
𝑛2
8
(
𝑎−𝑐
1+𝑛
)
2
.       (8) 
The social planner chooses 𝑛 to maximise social welfare (which is the sum of (6), (7) 
and (8)): 
             Max𝑛  𝑆𝑊
𝐶𝑅𝑆 = Max𝑛
𝑛(𝑎−𝑐)2(4+3𝑛)
8(1+𝑛)2
− 𝑛𝐾     (9) 
The welfare maximising 𝑛 is given by  
             
𝜕(𝑆𝑊𝐶𝑅𝑆)
𝜕𝑛
≡
(𝑎−𝑐)2(2+𝑛)
4(1+𝑛)3
− 𝐾 = 0                                         (10) 
It follows from (10) that as the cost of entry (i.e., 𝐾) falls, the welfare maximising 
number of final goods producers increases. 
 
Proposition 1 If the final goods production technology exhibits constant returns to 
scale, entry in the final goods market is insufficient. 
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Proof: Evaluating 
( )CRSSW
n


 at the free entry equilibrium number of final goods 
producers, i.e., substituting 
1
4
(
𝑎−𝑐
1+𝑛
)
2
 for K into (10), we get that 
( )
0
CRSSW
n



 since 
(𝑎−𝑐)2(2+𝑛)
4(1+𝑛)3
−
1
4
(
𝑎−𝑐
1+𝑛
)
2
=
(𝑎−𝑐)2
4(1+𝑛)3
> 0, which proves the result. ■ 
 
Entry creates two effects. First, as in Mankiw and Whinston (1986), it creates 
a “business-stealing effect” by lowering the outputs of the incumbent final goods 
producers. On the other hand, as observed by Ghosh and Morita (2007a, b), entry 
creates a “business-creation effect” in the input sector by raising the total input 
demand. We find that the latter effect dominates the former effect for social welfare 
and makes entry less attractive than the socially optimum level. This result affirms the 
finding of Ghosh and Morita (2007a, b), suggesting that entry is insufficient in a 
vertically related industry with constant returns to scale technologies. 
 
2.2. Production with decreasing return to scale technology 
We now consider the case of decreasing returns to scale technologies for the final 
goods production. Assume that the technology of the jth final goods producer, 
j=1,2,…,∞, is j jL q  or 
2
j jL q , implying that 
2
jq  inputs are required to produce 
jq  units of the output. 
If n final goods producers enter the market, the ith final goods producer, 
i=1,2,..,n, maximises 
            𝑀𝑎𝑥   𝜋𝑖
𝐷𝑅𝑆 =(𝑎 − 𝑄)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑤𝑞𝑖
2 − 𝐾 .              (12) 
The equilibrium output of the ith final goods producer is 
 𝑞𝑖
𝐷𝑅𝑆 =
𝑎(1+2𝑤)−1
1+𝑛(1+2𝑤)−1
.                 (13) 
The input supplier maximises the following expression to determine w: 
 2
1
(w c)
n
DRS
i
w
i
MaxU q

   .                (14) 
The equilibrium input price is  𝑤𝐷𝑅𝑆 =
1
2
(1 + 𝑛 + 4𝑐). Hence, the equilibrium profit 
of the input supplier is  𝑈𝐷𝑅𝑆 =
𝑛
8
(
𝑎2
1+𝑛+2𝑐
), the profit of the ith final goods producer 
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that entered the market is  𝜋𝑖
𝐷𝑅𝑆 =
𝑎2(3+n+4c)
8(1+n+2c)2
− 𝐾 and the consumer surplus is 
𝐶𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑆 =
𝑄2
2
=
1
8
(
𝑛𝑎
1+𝑛+2𝑐
)
2
. 
 The free entry equilibrium number of final goods producer is given by 
𝜋𝑖
𝐷𝑅𝑆 = 0 or 
  
𝑎2(3+n+4c)
8(1+n+2c)2
= K.                                                                                            (15) 
It follows from (15) that a lower K increases the free equilibrium number of final 
goods producers. 
 Now determine the welfare maximising number of firms, which is determined 
by maximising the following expression: 
             Max𝑛  𝑆𝑊
𝐷𝑅𝑆 = Max𝑛
𝑎2𝑛(4+3𝑛+6𝑐)
8(1+𝑛+2𝑐)2
− 𝑛𝐾.                         (16) 
The welfare maximising number of firms is given by 
            
𝜕(𝑆𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑆)
𝜕𝑛
≡
𝑎2(2+𝑛+3𝑐𝑛+7𝑐+6𝑐2)
4(1+𝑛+2𝑐)3
− 𝐾 = 0              (17) 
It follows from (17) that a lower K increases the welfare maximising number of final 
goods producers. 
 
Proposition 2: If the production technology exhibits decreasing return to scale, entry 
in the final goods market is excessive (insufficient) if the cost of entry is sufficiently 
low (high) so that the free entry equilibrium number of firms 
𝑛 > (<)√2(1 + 2𝑐 + 2𝑐2) − 1 ≡ 𝑛∗. 
Proof: We get that  
𝜕2(𝑆𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑆)
𝜕𝑛2
= −
𝑎2(5+2𝑛+6𝑐𝑛+16𝑐+12𝑐2)
4(1+𝑛+2𝑐)4
< 0 and evaluating 
( )DRSSW
n


 at the free entry equilibrium number of final goods producers, i.e., 
substituting  
𝑎2(3+n+4c)
8(1+n+2c)2
 for K into (17), we get that 
𝜕(𝑆𝑊𝐷𝑅𝑆)
𝜕𝑛
< (>)0 for 
𝑎2(2+7𝑐+6𝑐2+𝑛+3𝑐𝑛)
4(1+𝑛+2𝑐)3
< (>)
𝑎2(3+n+4c)
8(1+n+2c)2
  or  * 22 1 2c 2 1( ) cn n    , implying 
that entry is excessive (insufficient) for  * 22 1 2c 2 1( ) cn n    . Since the 
free entry equilibrium number of firms is negatively related to the cost of entry, 
excessive (insufficient) entry occurs, i.e., n > (<)n∗, for sufficiently low (high) cost 
of entry. ■ 
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The intuitions for Proposition 2 also follows from the trade-off between the 
“business-stealing effect” and “business-creation effect” as discussed in Proposition 1 
with an exception that, under decreasing returns to scale technology, the input price 
increases with the number of final goods producers, thus strengthening the business-
stealing effect. If the cost of entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently 
competitive, i.e., n > n∗,  a new entrant creates significant business-stealing effect by 
reducing the profits of a large number of incumbent final goods producers, thus 
creating excessive entry. However, if the cost of entry is high, the business-stealing 
effect is not so strong to outweigh the business-creation effect and entry is insufficient 
in this situation. 
 
3. Conclusion 
We show that the production technology plays an important role in determining social 
efficiency of entry of the final goods producers if the input supplier has market power. 
Entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to 
scale technology but it can be socially excessive if the cost of entry is low. Hence, the 
anti-competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable in a vertically related 
industry if the final goods market is characterised by decreasing returns to scale 
technologies. 
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